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“A Good Ally” - Norway and International Statebuilding in 
Afghanistan, 2001-2014  
 
Mats Berdal and Astri Suhrke 
 
Abstract 
 
The article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the 
Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and 
military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. 
Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, the article 
focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and 
long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-
making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s 
record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was charged with bringing security, good 
governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed 
relations with the US both highlights and helps to problematize the challenges – 
political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a 
coalition alongside the US. As for Norwegian efforts in Faryab, the article sees them 
as revealing of the many dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, 
fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s 
experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the 
attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to 
Afghanistan can be better understood. 
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“A Good Ally” - Norway and International Statebuilding in 
Afghanistan, 2001-2014  
 
Mats Berdal and Astri Suhrke1 
 
As the activities of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan were drawing to a close in December 2014, NATO’s newly 
appointed Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, chaired a session of the North Atlantic 
Council, specially convened to mark the end of ISAF’s mission. Striking a bullish 
note, Stoltenberg, Prime Minister of Norway from 2000 to 2001 and, again, from 
2005 to 2013, insisted that thirteen years of international intervention had left 
Afghanistan “more stable and prosperous than ever.”2 It was a claim that rested on a 
self-exculpatory narrative of developments in Afghanistan transparently at odds with 
realities on the ground.  In the years since the Secretary-General made his dubious 
claim, NATO’s original and desired end-state for the country – “a self-sustaining, 
moderate and democratic Afghan government able to exercise its authority and to 
operate throughout Afghanistan”3 – has receded still further into the distance. Indeed, 
since the end of ISAF’s mission, a sharp country-wide deterioration in security, a 
faltering aid-dependent economy, political instability at the centre and no progress in 
peace talks with the Taliban, have all combined to bring the primary objective of the 
initial US-led intervention – preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a sanctuary 
for international terrorists – back to the fore.4  
 
The Godal Commission: Background and Wider Relevance 
 
In spite of, or perhaps because of, this bleak and profoundly discouraging 
picture, very few of the 51 countries that contributed to the international coalition in 
                     
1 Disclaimer: Although both authors were members of the Norwegian Commission of Inquiry on 
Afghanistan, the views, arguments and judgements expressed in the present article are their own and do 
not necessarily reflect those of other Commission members or the Commission as a whole.  
2 “NATO Secretary General’s Opening Remarks”, 17 December 2014, 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116104.htm?selectedLocale=en 
3 “Longer-term strategy for NATO in its ISAF role in Afghanistan”, 8 October 2003, S/2003/970, UN 
Document, p.3.   
4 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “Afghan Security Crisis Sets State for Terrorists’ Resurgence”, New 
York Times, 2 December 2016.  
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Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 have undertaken comprehensive, properly 
resourced and critical evaluations of their own contributions to the mission.5 A 
notable exception to this pattern is provided by Norway, whose government decided, 
in late 2014, to establish a Commission of Inquiry to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s 
civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan.6 Led 
by Bjørn Tore Godal, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence, 
the commission was given a broad mandate, proper resources and extensive, if not 
unrestricted, access to classified sources and material.7 The final report, released in 
June 2016, explores the underlying reasons and drivers behind the decisions of 
successive Norwegian governments in relation to Afghanistan, assesses the results of 
the mission, and identifies lessons relevant to “planning, organising and implementing 
future Norwegian contributions to international operations”.8 The present article 
examines the principal findings, as well as some of the wider implications that flow 
from the Commission’s work. 
As the Godal Report itself makes clear, Norway’s overall contribution to the 
international coalition was small and, as such, of marginal relevance to the bigger 
picture in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014.9 Even so, in much the same way that 
                     
5 Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have all set up inquiries and/or commissioned studies into 
aspects of their Afghan involvement. In all these cases, however, the scope of officially sanctioned 
investigations has been hedged about by restrictions. In none of these cases, for example, has the 
contribution of Special Forces been critically evaluated.  
6 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001-2014 (A Good Ally: Norway in Afghanistan, 2001-2014), 
NOU, 2016:8, 6 June 2016 (henceforth Godal Report). An English language version of the report is 
scheduled for release in late 2017. All references to the report in this article are from the original 
Norwegian version, available at 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/09faceca099c4b8bac85ca8495e12d2d/no/pdfs/nou20162016
0008000dddpdfs.pdf. 
7 The Commission was not granted access to the verbatim records or minutes of Cabinet meetings, nor 
was it able to examine the records of the Cabinet Subcommittee (Underutvalget), which brought 
together a smaller number of key ministers and coalition Party leaders to resolve contentious and 
sensitive issues, including over Afghanistan. The workings of the Cabinet Subcommittee, which 
operated more informally under the government of Kjell Magne Bondevik (2001-5), became more 
regularised during Stoltenberg’s second period in office (2005-13). Otherwise, the source material 
available to the Commission was rich and extensive, and included evidence from interviews and closed 
hearings with more than 330 individuals. See, Godal Report, p.14 and pp.209-212.  For the 
increasingly important, if informal and unacknowledged, role of the Cabinet Subcommittee, see 
Kristoffer  Kolltveit, “Concentration of Decision-Making Power: Investigating the Role of the 
Norwegian Cabinet Subcommittee”, World Political Science Review, 9/1, (2013). 
8 “Government appoints commission on Afghanistan”, Press Release, 21 November 2014 
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/commission_afghanistan/id2341692/). 
9 Some 9000 Norwegian soldiers served in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. Norway spent 20 
billion Norwegian kroner (NKR) on its involvement, of which 11,5 billion was spent in support of 
military operations. Although a modest contribution overall, in some areas, notably development aid, 
Norwegian efforts surpassed those of most comparable smaller and medium-sized coalition members. 
Norway’s 2,3% share of the total ODA provided bilaterally to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 
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the long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry in the UK, released in July 2016, has 
raised questions relating to strategy, policy and planning for international 
interventions that transcend the story of the UK’s involvement in Iraq, so the Godal 
Commission’s detailed and comprehensive evaluation of Norway’s involvement in 
Afghanistan raises issues that are of broader analytical and policy interest.10 In 
exploring the Commission’s findings, we identify and focus on two sets of issues in 
particular. 
The first of these concerns Norway’s relations with the US, a long-standing 
and close strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-
making in Afghanistan dwarfed that of all other coalition partners. How Norway 
prioritised and managed its relations with the US serves both to highlight and to 
problematize the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and 
medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside one dominant, agenda-setting 
power committed to the pursuit of a “global war on terror”. One of the central issues 
raised by the Godal Report in this respect centres on how much scope for manoeuvre 
and independent action Norway possessed in dealings with the US over Afghanistan. 
Similarly, and again of comparative interest, how did Norwegian governments 
reconcile and seek to balance domestic political pressures with US demands and 
operational priorities, especially when these were in obvious conflict with one 
another? 
The second set of issues relates to developments in the province of Faryab in 
northern Afghanistan, where, from 2005 to 2012, Norway was responsible for one of 
26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) established, nominally under ISAF, to 
bring security, good governance and development to Afghanistan’s provinces. In this 
capacity, Norway funded civilians aid programmes, interacted with local power-
brokers, engaged with the political economy of the province, and, in theory at any rate, 
sought to impose its priorities and apply its approach to stabilisation and state-
building within its area of responsibility. As will be argued more fully, Norway’s 
activities in Faryab province, its effort to bring stability and extend the authority and 
reach of the central Afghan government to the north, are revealing of many of the 
dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, in the end, fatally undermined the 
                                                           
exceeded that of Netherlands (2,2%), Sweden (1.8%), and Denmark (1.1%), and it compared 
favourably to larger donors such as Germany (6.3%) and the UK (6.3%). Godal Report, p.78.  
10 Report of Iraq Inquiry (henceforth Chilcot Report), 6 July 2016, available in full at 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/   
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international intervention as a whole.11 As such, Norway’s experience provides a 
microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the grand attempt to transfer the 
structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better 
understood.  
Approaching these issues, the article proceeds in two parts. Part one identifies 
and discusses the major findings of the Godal Report, focusing on the core objectives 
of Norway’s mission, their implementation and the extent to which they can be said to 
have been met. It places Norwegian decisions and actions within the context of the 
US-led involvement in the country after 2001 and, in particular, the overarching 
priority given by successive American administrations to fight what they chose to 
define as a global and open-ended “war on terror”. It emphasises how decision-
making in Norway and policy outcomes in Afghanistan were shaped by conflicting 
domestic and international political pressures, by enormously complex and 
demanding Afghan realities on the ground, as well as by a machinery of government 
that was anything but “joined-up” and by governments that failed to develop a clear 
strategy – as distinct from expressing a desirable end-state – for its engagement in 
Afghanistan.12 
The second part explores Norway’s relations with the US in greater detail. It 
highlights the degree to which the perceived importance of being seen as a “good ally” 
conditioned reflexes and structured Norwegian choices. It also, however, asks 
whether Norwegian concerns about the potentially damaging effects on US-
Norwegian relations of choices made in relation to Afghanistan were in fact 
exaggerated, and whether, as a result, Norway’s room for diplomatic manoeuvre and 
more independent action were thus needlessly constrained. 
     
THE GODAL REPORT: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
 
Three Core Objectives: Overview and Score Card 
 
Norway’s military, civilian and financial contribution to the international 
operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was designed to advance three core 
                     
11 For a systematic exploration of these contradictions, see Astri Suhrke, When More is Less - The 
International Project in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Company, 2011). 
12 The regional context, discussed in the Commission’s report, is also critical to an understanding of 
policy outcomes but is not directly related to the foci of this article. 
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objectives. Although these were officially presented as mutually reinforcing, their co-
existence was fraught with tensions from the outset – a reality that became ever more 
apparent as the war intensified and the contradictions inherent in the international 
state-building project in Afghanistan deepened after 2006. Changes in the balance of 
international and domestic political pressures bearing on cabinet decision-making in 
Oslo ensured that the relative weight attached to each objective varied over time in 
the official discourse about Norway’s role in Afghanistan. Even so, and as the Godal 
Commission makes abundantly clear, the objectives themselves and, crucially, the 
hierarchy of importance among them remained constant. 
The first and single most important objective was to demonstrate Norway’s 
reliability as a steadfast and dependable ally of the US, an objective also deemed vital 
to “safeguarding” NATO.13 The title of the Godal report – “A Good Ally” – points to 
the centrality and consistency of this objective over time.  The Commission noted that 
the determining influence of this objective on the character of Norway’s involvement 
in Afghanistan was greater than the public discourse about that involvement would 
appear to suggest.14 The perceived need to preserve and strengthen the strategic 
alliance with the US framed deliberations and influenced all of the government’s 
more specific decisions over Afghanistan. As such, it extended beyond the initial, 
perfectly understandable, and widely shared display of solidarity with the US 
following the attacks of 9/11. As a key factor in decision-making regarding military 
contributions to the international mission in particular, the Norwegian government’s 
desire to demonstrate its political reliability as an ally overshadowed any assessment 
of the actual effect that a given contribution might have on the ground. As a core 
objective, the determination of successive governments to demonstrate Norway’s 
credentials as a reliable and politically visible ally, and to reap benefits therefrom, 
was – in the view of the Godal Commission – very largely achieved: the closeness of 
bilateral ties at the political level was reaffirmed, while, at the operational and tactical 
levels, cooperation with the US in Afghanistan has translated into “strengthened 
cooperation” in the fields of intelligence, counter-terrorism and “other SOF 
operations”.15 
                     
13 Godal Report, pp.193-4.  
14 Ibid., p.194   
15 Ibid., p.196. 
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The second major objective involved assisting the US in its “Global War on 
Terror” by preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a sanctuary for terrorist 
groups and networks. Support for US-led counterterrorism (CT) operations provided 
the initial focus for Norwegian military involvement in Afghanistan, and assumed 
concrete form with the participation of Norwegian Special Forces (NORSOF) and 
fighter aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).16 Mounting evidence of 
prisoner abuse by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and controversy about the scope 
of, and methods employed in, the “war on terror”17, contributed to the decision of the 
Norwegian government to downplay and, eventually, re-direct its contribution from 
OEF to ISAF, emphasising instead the latter’s unambiguous mandate from the UN 
and its seemingly more benign state- and democracy-building role in the country.18 
From 2010 onwards, however, the failures of exogenous-led state-building and the 
prospect of eventual ISAF withdrawal led to a renewed emphasis, also by the 
Norwegian government, on the achievements made, or so it was argued, in combating 
international terrorism. Addressing the Norwegian parliament in June 2013, the 
Foreign Minister, Espen Barth Eide, boldly declared ISAF’s “main mission” of 
eliminating Afghanistan as a “sanctuary for international terrorism” to have been 
accomplished.19 The Godal Commission was much less convinced, concluding 
instead that the objective of preventing terrorist and militant groups from operating in 
and out of Afghanistan had only been “partially met”. In retrospect, even this verdict 
stands out as overly generous. Since 2014, the activities of Al Qaeda operatives and 
ISIL-affiliated groups have both increased markedly, prompting US commanders to 
call for more troops and stepped up activities in the country.20 
                     
16 NORSOF deployed in support of OEF on three rotations (2002, 2003 and 2005). A detachment of 6 
F-16 aircraft, operating out of Kyrgyzstan alongside Dutch and Danish aircraft, provided close air 
support for US combat forces operating in the border areas with Pakistan over a six-month period in 
2002-2003. See Godal Report, p. 213. For the operations in the border areas, see Operation Enduring 
Freedom, March 2002-April 2005, US Army Center for Military History, 2016, p.21.   
17 Craig Pyes and Mark Mazetti,“US probing alleged abuse of Afghans”, LA Times, 21 September 
2004; “Senator Patrick Leahy to Hon. Donald Rumsfeld”, 1 October 2004, Congressional Record – 
Senate, (www.congress.gov/crec/2004/10/09/CREC-2004-10-09-pt1-PgS10979-3.pdf.)  
18 Godal Report, pp.196-97. A further, arguably still more important, reason for the government’s shift 
away from OEF was that ISAF was operated by NATO and had an explicit UN mandate, both 
institutions seen as critically important in Oslo. 
19 Espen Barth Eide, “Redegjørelse av utenriksministeren om utviklingen i Afghanistan og Norges 
engasjement i landet”, Stortinget, 4 juni 2013. 
20 See, Jessica Donati and Habib Khan Totakhil, “A New US Front in Afghanistan?”, Wall Street 
Journal, 22 November 2016; Michael Gordon, “US General Seeks a ‘a few Thousand’ More Troops in 
Afghanistan”, New York Times, 9 February 2017. 
  8 
The third major objective of Norway’s involvement was to help build a 
democratic, legitimate and properly functioning Afghan state along Western lines, a 
state whose legitimacy and authority ISAF would, from 2003 onwards, gradually seek 
to extend throughout the whole of the country. Much of the Norwegian state-building 
effort was concentrated in the Faryab province. To the public, in particular, 
contributing to building a modern Afghan state was presented as a prime justification 
for Norway’s unprecedented commitment of military and civilian resources to 
Afghanistan, a commitment that saw substantial infusions of development aid 
targeting education, governance and rural development, combined with a special 
emphasis on such crosscutting priorities as women’s rights, anti-corruption and 
human rights. For all this, the Godal Commission found Norway’s peace- and state-
building efforts, viewed as a whole, to have proved the least successful aspect of 
Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, it is difficult to classify them as 
anything but an abject failure. Very few of the achievements made between 2005 and 
2012 have proved sustainable. This is true also in the field of education, which long 
has been a major aid priority for Norway. In Faryab alone, 177 schools had been built 
with Norwegian support. In 2014, the Godal Commission asked an Afghan 
monitoring team to assess whether and how the schools were functioning. The team 
was unable to reach almost half of the schools due to the security situation. Of the 
remaining schools, the team found that only 68 were in operation.21   
The steadily worsening security situation in Faryab showed that Norway’s 
approach to stabilization, which made a sharp operational distinction between civilian 
and military roles, was no more successful in stemming the insurgency than the 
dominant PRT model in ISAF that integrated civilian and military functions, the 
Godal Commission concluded.22 The very limited power of the PRT was also a 
function of other features of the mission. Military personnel rotated every six month, 
making for virtually no continuity Consisting of 437 persons at its height (including 
civilians), the team was to cover a province the size two-thirds of Belgium with a 
population of about one million, mostly spread out in small villages that dotted the 
mountainous landscape. The uneven ratios reflected the lack of realism in the broader 
ISAF strategy to address the growing insurgency. The PRT could do little more than 
monitor developments, collect information and launch isolated offensives against the 
                     
21 Godal Report, p. 11. 
22 Ibid.,p.11. 
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Taliban. The result typically was pin prick operations that did not significantly reduce 
enemy capabilities but increased the risks and cost for civilians, who were caught in 
the middle. In a case detailed by the Godal Report, village elders who had cooperated 
with the PRT during one operation were executed when the Norwegians withdrew 
and the Taliban returned.23  
Since the drawdown of the international forces in 2014, the security situation 
in Faryab has continued to deteriorate. Taliban has twice closed in on the capital, 
Maimane. As of early 2017, Faryab had become among the least secure of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces.24 There is a certain, if cruel, irony to this development as 
the original Norwegian decision to assume responsibility for the PRT was taken, in 
part, because the province was viewed as a relatively peaceful and stable part of 
Afghanistan.   
What, then, are the key factors that help explain this decidedly mixed and, as 
far as developments in Afghanistan are concerned, deeply disappointing record?  
 
Determinants of Norway’s Record in Afghanistan  
 
The reasons for Norway’s failure to meet its core objectives, save that of 
demonstrating her reliability as “a good ally”, are, to a degree, inseparable from the 
reasons behind the failure of the international intervention in Afghanistan as a whole. 
The tensions and fault-lines that ran through the international project in Afghanistan 
framed and complicated Norway’s military and civilian contribution in both direct 
and indirect ways. At the same time, the credibility and coherence of Norwegian 
efforts also reflected domestic dysfunctions, shortcomings and policy choices, some 
taken by default but many taken deliberately on the basis of untested assumptions and 
considerations extraneous to the situation in Afghanistan itself. Assessing the record 
of Norway’s involvement requires, therefore, that attention be given to the interplay 
between international context and domestic political factors and pressures. Chief 
                     
23 Ibid., p.126. 
24 “Quarterly Report to Congress - Special Inspector General Report for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR), 30 October, 2016”; UNAMA, Reports on the Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflict – 
2017 Midyear Report (released July 2017),  (https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-
reports) p.72; “‘Mortar attack kills 13 civilians’ in Faryab province”, Al Jazeera News, 12 August 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/mortar-attack-kills-13-civilians-faryab-province-
170812132524533.html; Bill Rogi, “Taliban Threatens another provincial capital in Afghan North”, 
21 October  2016 (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/10/taliban-threaten-another-
provincial-capital-in-afghan-north.php); 
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among the latter were: a notable absence of strategic thinking within government, the 
effects of coalition party politics, and a lack of “joined-up” government. 
 The international intervention in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014 was 
plagued by a fundamental and never-resolved tension between, on the one hand, the 
dominant strategic priority of the US to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban” as part of its open-ended “war on terror”, and, on the other, a more 
ambitious set of objectives, formally adopted by ISAF in 2003, which, in the words of 
Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defence from early 2006 to 2011, “looked a lot like 
nation-building”.25 The tension was institutionalised in the parallel activities and the 
uneasy relationship that existed between OEF and ISAF. Although the US was 
formally committed to ISAF’s more expansive objectives, strategic priority was, in 
the final analysis, always given to counterterrorism premised on a broad and 
permissive definition of terrorists and insurgents.26 This inevitably collided with the 
state- and peace-building objectives held by coalition partners and espoused by ISAF.  
Of particular and lasting significance in this respect were the decisions taken 
and the tone set in the early OEF phase, before NATO, in assuming command of 
ISAF, committed itself to extending the authority of central government throughout 
the country. During this period, US forces – spurred on by the desire for retribution 
and revenge following the events of 9/11 – cultivated and formed alliances with local 
and regional strongmen and warlords, many of whom had risen to prominence in the 
deeply destructive civil war that followed the collapse of President Najibullah’s 
regime in 1992. By restoring power at the provincial and district level to predatory, 
violent warlords and their tribally-based patronage networks who had lost out to 
Taliban in the mid-1990s,US-led coalition forces laid the ground for Taliban’s 
resurgence. Crucially, these actions also gave rise to a distinctive political economy of 
conflict that contrasted sharply with what Mike Martin has aptly termed the 
“insurgency narrative”,27 which came to underpin NATO policy: the tendency to 
reduce the conflict in Afghanistan to a struggle between a supposedly legitimate 
government seeking to create a modern, democratic and liberal-looking State, 
                     
25 Robert Gates, Duty (London: WH Allen, 2014), p.203. 
26 Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy we Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al 
Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2011 (London: Hurts & Co., 2012), p. 326.  
27 Mike Martin, An Intimate War – An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict (London: Hurst & Co, 
2014),p.195.  
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supported in that endeavour by the West, and a backward-looking, ideologically 
driven Taliban insurgency, supported from across the border in Pakistan.28  
While the Taliban did include “ideological” fighters, the “insurgency narrative” 
grossly simplified the dynamics of conflict, failing to capture how the interaction of 
ethno-tribal grievances, local politics and power rivalries - set within the violent, 
deeply corrupt and criminalised post-Taliban political order that crystalized as a result 
of choices made in 2001 and 2002 - fuelled violence and insecurity throughout the 
country. As a result, ISAF’s efforts to stabilise the country through aid, reconstruction 
and development assistance played into and frequently reinforced predatory and 
exploitative political economies.29 This was equally the case of Norway’s mission in the 
north.  
  There was also in Norway, as among her allies, a generalised failure to 
appreciate how cultural, political and historical factors distinctive to the Afghan 
context would, of necessity, condition society’s response to a large, foreign and 
protracted military presence. This failure – evident in ISAF’s costly neglect of the 
power of Afghan, especially Pashtun, nationalism, as well as in the importance of 
understanding the political economy and local dynamics of conflict – resulted in 
policy choices that, all too frequently, fuelled rather than mitigated violence and 
instability. 
Tensions between strategic priorities, and the primacy given by the US to 
counterterrorism broadly conceived, had other consequences too. In terms of 
operations, it resulted in a complicated and dysfunctional set of command and control 
arrangements that included multiple and separate chains of command, within theatre 
as well as between capitals and troop-contributing nations. While this gave PRTs 
considerable autonomy, it undermined overall unity of effort and resulted in the 
pursuit of conflicting priorities. In particular, the actions of US Special Forces, 
notably their “kill and capture” tactics, repeatedly undermined the “goodwill that the 
ISAF ‘hearts and minds’ strategy aimed to develop”, as Saikal noted in 2012.30   
                     
28 For the critical importance of local and historical context to an understanding of the patterns of 
violence and conflict in Afghanistan, see study by Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser – Thirty 
Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst & Co., 2013). 
29 For the crystallisation of the post-2001 political economies see also, Vanda Felbab-Brown, 
“Afghanistan Affectations – How to break Political-Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition”, 
UNU Centre for Policy Research, April 2017, pp.9-13.  
30 Amin Saikal, “The UN and Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization and Statebuilding”, 
International Peacekeeping, vol.19, no.2, April 2012, p.227. 
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The coalition context also influenced Norwegian policies and actions in more 
indirect ways. For example, the broad permissive definition of terrorists adopted by 
the US limited the “scope for exploring a wider political settlement to end the war”, 
something Norway, to its credit, began to explore as early as 2007.31 Nor could 
Norway insulate itself from the psychological impact of, and political fall-out from, 
the intensification of military operations from 2006 onwards, resulting in mounting 
civilian casualties and growing sense among Afghan civilians that ISAF was a hostile 
occupying force.32  
 
The Faryab Microcosm 
 
These tensions and dilemmas manifested themselves in the Norwegian 
engagement in Faryab in several specific ways. ISAF’s mandate to extend the 
authority of the central government to the provincial level was resisted by local 
strongmen, above all General Abdul Rashid Dostum who had surged to power as 
valued ally of the US in 2001. This particular tension became embodied in the 
difficult and at times openly conflictual relationship between Dostum and President 
Hamid Karzai. When the Norwegian PRT deployed to Faryab in 2005, Dostum had 
placed his men in key provincial positions, including the police and the governor’s 
office. Some were gradually replaced and Karzai in 2008 appointed a governor from 
the outside, but Norwegian embassy and other reports back to Oslo repeatedly 
commented on the ability of Dostum and his men to undermine the effectiveness of 
the formal governing institutions. 33  Dostum was in a constant state of rivalry also 
with another local strongman and later governor in the neighbouring province of 
Balkh, Mohammad Noor Atta. The triangular power dynamic had a strong ethnic 
dimension (Dostum is an Uzbek, Atta a Tajik and Karzai a Pashtun) that reinforced its 
conflictual nature.  The PRT was caught in the middle of these power rivalries, which 
reverberated on the local level to create continuous instability and make development 
very difficult. 34 
                     
31 Discussed more fully in chapter 9 of the Godal Report. 
32 Godal Report, p.29. See also Kate Clark, “How the Guests Became an Enemy: Afghan Attitudes 
towards Westerners since 2001”, Middle East Institute Viewpoints, Afghanistan, 1979-2009: In the 
Grip of Conflict”, www.mei.edu, pp.50-52. 
33 Godal Report, p.115.   
34 Ibid., p. 115. 
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 The local power structure around Dostum need not have been problematic if it 
had been a constructive agent in the statebuilding project. In fact, it was not. 
Dostum’s record as alleged war criminal had been established early on, and the 
ruthlessness of the general as well as of his 2nd tier warlords was a matter of deep 
concern to the Norwegian embassy and the PRT.35 Local elders initially beseeched the 
Norwegian ambassador with requests for protection against abuse by local 
strongmen.36 Yet there was little the Norwegians could do. Dostum was too powerful 
and close to the US forces, his militias were armed, and the PRT was small and 
exposed. The team’s base had been attacked by a mob in early 2006, an attack that 
was widely suspected of being at least tolerated by Dostum.  
 During the second half of the decade, when Taliban became more active in the 
province, the military case for supporting Dostum and his militias became more 
convincing as well, enabling Dostum to strengthen his position further.37 As it turned 
out, the military rationale was vindicated in the short run. It was Dostum and his 
militias, not the  Afghan Army, that pressed back repeated Taliban offensives in 
Faryab after the international military force had withdrawn in 2014.  Yet the Godal 
Report recognized a deeper contradiction in the engagement:  trying to build a 
legitimate state in the middle of war was virtually impossible.38 
 The “insurgency narrative” had gained currency among the Norwegian 
military most closely involved in Faryab soon after Norway took over leadership of 
the PRT in 2005. This narrative formed the basis for a controversial decision to 
expand the PRT’s area of operations to include a district in the neighbouring province 
of Badghis, which the PRT believed was a staging ground for Taliban attacks into 
Faryab. Because Badghis was located in NATO’s Regional Command West, but more 
readily accessible from Faryab, which was in NATO’s Regional Command North, 
permission for the PRT to cross into Badghis was a complicated matter. To gain 
access on a regular basis, high-level Norwegian officials engaged in a prolonged and 
eventually successful lobbying effort. 39 On 1January 2009, Ghormach district was 
                     
35 Ibid., pp.114-115. 
36 See Suhrke, When More is Less, p.91. 
37 Godal Report, p.115. 
38 Ibid., p.12. 
39 The Germans (who were leading RC North) initially and strongly opposed the expansion of 
operations due to the political caveats on German operations imposed by the Bundestag. In the end, a 
solution was found that entailed changing the Afghan provincial boundaries. Karzai made clear, 
however, that including Ghormach district in Faryab as requested by the Norwegians was to be 
temporary and for military purposes only. Godal Report, pp. 123-124. 
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officially included in Faryab province and was thus incorporated in the domain of the 
Norwegian PRT.   
 The expansion was controversial for two reasons.  Norwegian intelligence 
assessments had initially been divided.40 While the Army intelligence unit posted to 
Faryab saw the Taliban factor as a systemic explanation for instability in the area, the 
Military intelligence service stressed the essentially local nature of the conflict 
dynamic, pointing to complex ethnic and parochial rivalries, including control over 
smuggling routes.41  The Army view, as we have seen, won out. Secondly, the 
expansion was followed by a sharp escalation in armed clashes, both in Ghormach 
and in the districts of Faryab proper.  
 As the escalation and Norwegian losses mounted, the intelligence picture 
contained more nuances that pointed to the underlying tensions in the engagement as 
a whole. When, in 2010, Norwegian intelligence analysts sought to explain why 
Pashtuns were attacking Norwegian troops, three main reasons were put forward.42 
The first was immediate economic gains, namely to protect opium smuggling routes. 
The second stemmed from ethnic divisions that in this case, and by extension much of 
northern Afghanistan, caused problems in the statebuilding project at the provincial 
level. In Faryab, the Pashtuns formed a minority, were generally poorer than the rest 
of the population and had little representation in the formal institutions of governance. 
After 2001, these institutions as well as informal, de facto structures of power were 
dominated by Tajiks and Uzbeks. Sensing that the international forces were imposing 
Uzbek and Tajik rulers on them, the Pashtuns directed their grievances and anger at 
the PRT.  The third reason offered for the insurgency was derived from the 
international presence itself:  legitimacy was gained by fighting against what was seen 
a foreign occupation force.43  
 
 
The Absence Strategy and Strategic Thinking 
 
While conflicting policy objectives among key allies undoubtedly complicated 
Norwegian decision-making and activities in Afghanistan, the Godal Commission 
                     
40 Godal Report, p.123. 
41Ibid., p.123. 
42 Ibid.,p.130. 
43 Ibid., p.130. 
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was clear in its view that this did not release the Norwegian government from the 
obligation to develop a strategic and joined-up approach to its own contribution. And 
yet, a striking feature of Norwegian decision-making in relation to Afghanistan – and 
a key finding of the Godal Report – was precisely the absence of strategy and 
strategic thinking: the absence, that is, of any structured and systematic effort to 
consider the implications of proposed courses of actions, to challenge untested 
assumptions, and continually to review, in light of developments on the ground in 
Afghanistan, the relationship between ways, means and ends. To be sure, there was no 
shortage of general statements setting out what the government wanted to see happen 
in Afghanistan. But, just as the Chilcot Inquiry found in relation to the UK’s post-
conflict plans and activities in Iraq, “strategies … tended to describe a desired end 
state without setting out how it would be reached”.44 This tendency was, if anything, 
more pronounced in the Norwegian case, and it applied both to the activities of the 
Norwegian PRT in Faryab and to key decision-points for the intervention as a whole.   
The failure to connect ways, means and ends was most evident in relation to 
Faryab. When Norway assumed lead responsibility for the PRT in 2005, no “detailed 
directions” had been drawn up setting out what the PRT would actually do in the 
province.45 While the kind of force to deploy and where it might be located within 
Afghanistan was discussed, there was no systematic discussion of what the force was 
meant to achieve once it had deployed. The lack of any “strategic debate at the highest 
political and military level” in Norway continued after 2005.46 The attempt, finally, to 
develop and articulate “a Faryab strategy” in 2009, against the backdrop of what was 
by then a much worsened security situation, resulted in a poorly crafted document that 
resembled a “statement of ambitions rather than a strategy”.47  
Possibly the most important decision made by the government in relation to 
Faryab  – to incorporate Ghormach district into the formal Norwegian area of 
operations – reflected the absence of strategic thinking. The decision was a response 
to tactical problems on the ground without a consideration of broader resource and 
political implications, as well as likely consequences, of adding another and 
particularly unstable district to an area of operation that already was vast relative to 
PRT capabilities, even considering related ISAF/OEF assets that intermittently 
                     
44 Chilcot Report – Section 9.8: Conclusions the Post-Conflict Period, p.501. 
45 Godal Report, p.120.  
46 Ibid.,p.54.  
47 Ibid., p.119. 
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operated in the area. Rather, the decision was made with exclusive reference to 
immediate tactical problems facing the PRT, framed in a generalized counter-
insurgency language penned by the Chief of Defence.48  “By taking responsibility also 
for Ghormach,” the Godal Commission concluded, “it appears that Norwegian 
authorities allowed immediate security concerns to take precedence over a realistic 
assessment of resources.” 49  
A similar myopia characterized the Norwegian discussion of the relationship 
between the military and civilian components of the PRT. The division of labour 
between these elements and their coordination (vs integration) absorbed an enormous 
amount of political energy. A running debate about the reasons for the lack of 
progress in Faryab – a debate that acquired an accusatory and bitter undertone as the 
insurgency gained momentum and Norwegian casualties mounted – tended to move 
centre stage in any discussion of the Norwegian engagement.50 The issue continued to 
generate heated debate also after 2014. When the Godal report was presented to the 
Parliament, the Minister of Defence mistakenly used the word “integrated” rather than 
“coordinated” to describe the PRT structure in Faryab. At that point, the near-
unanimity that had prevailed in the parliamentary discussion was shattered.51 While 
concluding that the structure of the PRT did not significantly influenced the outcome 
in Faryab, the Godal Report nevertheless gives the issue much attention.52 .  Whether 
the focus on the PRT structure actually crowded out the potential for strategic 
discussion of policy alternatives is unclear, and the Commission did not pose the 
question. 
Key decision points provided in theory an occasion for a wider discussion and, 
if necessary, a reassessment of government policy. Yet strategic debate among 
ministers and senior officials at these junctures was also notably absent. These 
included: the decision to expand ISAF’s mandate and role in 2003; whether or not to 
                     
48 Ibid.,p.125. 
49Ibid.,p. 125. 
50 For the bitterness that sometimes broke through to the surface of the debate, see this Op Ed piece by 
a former PRT-chief. Rune Solberg, “Bistand på Ville Veier”, Aftenposten,  6 December 2010,  
( https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/Bistand-pa-ville-veier-202744b.html ) 
51 “Redegjørelse av utenriksministeren og forsvarsministeren om Afghanistan, inkludert rapporten fra 
det regjeringsoppnevnte utvalget som har evaluert og trukket lærdommer av Norges sivile og militære 
innsats i Afghanistan for perioden 2001-2014”, https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Saker/Sak/?p=67464 
52The Commission endorsed the principle of separation of military and civilian roles in stabilization 
operations while, at the same time, recognising the importance of coordinating of civilian and military 
efforts. 
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assume lead responsibility for an area of operations; whether to deploy troops to 
southern Afghanistan in 2005; and what stand to adopt in relation to the counter-
insurgency strategy embraced by ISAF in 2009. While these decision points plainly 
raised issues of major impact on the development of Norway’s Afghanistan policy, 
they did not result in a systematic and structured process of assessing overall strategy. 
Instead, the driving principle which, reduced to its bare bones, seemed to underpin 
Norway’s disparate efforts in Afghanistan was pithily summed up by the Godal 
Commission as “in together, out together”.53 
Again, the parallels with the findings of Chilcot are instructive and 
illuminating.54 In both cases, key decision points did not involve collective and 
substantive discussion among key ministers “on the basis of interdepartmental advice 
agreed at a senior level”,55 aimed at identifying “wider implications and risks” linked 
to different policy options and courses of actions. In Norway as in the UK, the 
purpose of a “more structured process” would have been to provide “a mechanism to 
probe and challenge the implications of proposals before decisions were taken”. 56 No 
such mechanism existed in Norway. 
It needs to be added that the necessary basis for rethinking and adjusting 
strategy – an intelligence-led understanding of developments on the ground, drawing 
also on open sources – was not lacking, even though such understanding clearly also 
improved over time. Indeed, Norwegian intelligence invested significant resources 
and expertise in Afghanistan, and, to this end, collaborated closely with allies.57 Over 
time, “situational awareness” acquired through intelligence gathering, driven by force 
protection requirements and the operational necessity of coming to terms with local 
conflict dynamics, improved markedly.58 Intelligence reports demonstrated a range of 
different and at times analytically conflicting perspectives, particularly regarding the 
nature of the insurgency, as in the aforementioned analysis of the situation in Faryab 
in 2010.59 Such assessments constituted a potential basis for considering policy 
alternatives.  Yet the Godal Commission was “unable to ascertain” the extent to 
                     
53 Godal Report, p.10. 
54 See in particular, Chilcot Report – Section 9.8, Conclusions: the Post-Conflict Period, pp.501-505.   
55 Chilcot Report – Executive Summary, p.58 
56 Ibid., p.59. 
57 Godal Report, pp.66-70. 
58 In much the same way that the UK PRT in Helmand developed a better and more sophisticated 
understanding of the political economy of Helmand over time. See, Capturing the Lessons from the 
Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team, Wilton Park Report, WPR1322, March 2015. 
59 Godal Report, p.130.  
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which political and military leadership at the strategic level drew on the findings of 
the intelligence community.60    
 
Coalition Party Politics 
 
Coalition party politics provides another part of the explanation for the evident 
difficulties of developing a more strategic approach to Norway’s engagement in 
Afghanistan. This was particularly true for the Red-Green coalition from 2005 to 
2013, whose members were deeply divided over policy towards Afghanistan.61 The 
Socialist Left Party, then in opposition, had from the beginning criticized the OEF as 
a “war of aggression”. When in the governing coalition after 2005, the party resisted 
any deepening of Norway’s involvement in what it saw as a misguided militarisation 
of the international involvement in Afghanistan, even though it was not opposed to 
the ISAF/UN mandate.62 The political compromises and horse-trading needed to hold 
the coalition together resulted in policy choices that were poorly, if at all, linked to an 
evidence-based assessment of the likely impact of those choices on the ground.63 The 
clearest and most striking example of this, highlighted by the Godal Commission, was 
the decision in 2007 substantially to increase the amount of development aid to 
Afghanistan in line with the principle that there should be parity between Norway’s 
military and civilian contributions to Afghanistan. The decision, as with others 
regarding the volume of development aid provided to Afghanistan, took no account of 
factors critical to aid effectiveness: the absorptive capacity of the local economy; the 
expertise and administrative capacity needed to monitor disbursement and aid flows; 
and the corruption-generating risks associated with the injecting large amounts of 
money into Afghanistan’s complex political economy. Unsurprisingly, the overall 
results were decidedly uneven and have proved to be of limited sustainability.64 
 
Absence of joined-up government 
                     
60 Ibid., pp.68-69. 
61 The Socialist Left Party was the second largest party in the Stoltenberg II coalition after Labour, 
having received 8.8% of the popular vote in the elections that brought the coalition to power. 
62 Part of the problem with this position was the blurring of the line between OEF and ISAF operations 
in the south, again an expression of the multiple and contradictory objectives of the engagement and 
associated complicated and obscure (at least to most outsiders) lines of command. 
63 Godal Report, p.88. 
64 Ibid., p.77.  
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Studies of the fragmented and frequently ill-coordinated actions of donors 
engaged in peacebuilding in fragile and war-torn states over the past twenty years 
have highlighted the supply side of the problem, that is, the lack of effective cross 
departmental cooperation within donor governments. Specifically, the persistence of 
vertically organised, or stove-piped, divisions between ministries of foreign affairs, 
defence and development – working towards their own mandates and, usually, also 
within different time frames  – have been found to undermine “policy coherence” and 
“integrated approaches” in post-conflict settings.65 This lack of joined-up-government 
was also a striking feature of Norwegian policy towards Afghanistan. The Ministry of 
Defence and the Agency for Development Cooperation (formally under auspices of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in particular had minimal interaction over 
Afghanistan policy. The lack of any precedent for an expeditionary mission of the 
scale and complexity of Afghanistan, not helped by very different institutional and 
bureaucratic sub-cultures among government departments and agencies, clearly 
provide part of the explanation for this state of affairs. Moreover, the fact that 
individual ministries, in Norway well as in other Nordic countries, are constitutionally 
responsible to Parliament has also encouraged a tendency towards “departmentalism” 
and “silos” in decision-making.66 Indeed, this principle of ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament is one reason “why Norway has strong line ministries while ministries 
with coordination responsibilities are relatively weak.”67  
More fundamentally, however, lack of “jointness” was bound up in the 
aforementioned absence of overall strategic focus. This because, as Stewart and 
Brown perceptively note, true policy coherence can only emanate from a “common, 
government-wide strategic vision on priority objectives.”68 Without it, formal 
coordinating bodies, mechanisms and technocratic solutions designed to encourage 
coherence “by themselves cannot compensate for disagreement on ends”.69 The 
Norwegian MOD was instinctively and reflexively focussed on the core objective of 
preserving and strengthening ties with the US (discussed more fully below), while the 
                     
65Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Great than the Sum of its Parts? – Assessing “Whole of 
Government” approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007).  
66 We are grateful to one of our anonymous reviewers for drawing our attention to this point.  
67 Kristoffer Kolltveit, Cabinet Decision-Making and Concentration of Power – A Study of the 
Norwegian Executive Centre, PhD dissertation, University of Oslo, 2013, p. 8. 
68 Patrick and Brown, Great than the Sum of its Parts?, p.6.  
69 Ibid.,p.7. 
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development community was, unsurprisingly, more concerned about promoting 
development objectives in Afghanistan.  
The resulting tensions explain the less-than-impressive achievements of 
Norway’s State Secretary Forum for Afghanistan, formally established in early 2006, 
involving politically appointed state secretaries from key departments. Designed to 
coordinate policies across departments and assist in developing a “coherent 
Norwegian Afghanistan policy”, government officials were anxious to present the 
Forum to allies abroad as well as to the public at home “as a concrete expression of 
Norway’s willingness and ability to coordinate contributions to Afghanistan across 
national sectors”.70 In reality, and as the Godal Commission swiftly concluded, the 
Forum acted as little more than a hub for sharing information among government 
actors. It did not coordinate policies, let alone provide a forum for substantive 
discussion of strategy. 
 
“A GOOD ALLY”: NORWAY AND RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
Norway’s “Special Relationship” with the U.S.  
 
The Chilcot Inquiry stressed the central importance of the UK’s close and 
long-standing alliance relationship with the US as a “determining factor in the 
Government’s decisions over Iraq.”71 On all key decision points, Chilcot concluded, 
the UK had “decided that it was right or necessary to defer to its close and senior 
partner”.72 The fundamental reasons for this were twofold: first, “concern that vital 
areas of co-operation between the UK and the US could be damaged if the UK did not 
give the US its full support over Iraq”, and, secondly, “the belief that the best way to 
influence US policy towards the direction preferred by the UK was to commit full and 
unqualified support, and seek to persuade from the inside.”73  
As noted above, Norway’s long-standing alliance relationship to the US was 
also the determining factor in the government’s decisions over Afghanistan. Indeed, 
                     
70 Lene Ekhaugen, “Central government coordination structures for international operations: The 
emergence and design of Norway’s Afghanistan Forum”, Research paper (unpublished), Institute for 
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72 Ibid., p.51. 
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preserving and strengthening the relationship with the US was the “first and most 
important objective for the whole of the period” between 2001 and 2014.74 The first 
of the two reasons identified by Chilcot provide the key to also understanding 
Norwegian policy choices: for successive governments, concern that “vital areas of 
cooperation” might be undermined if Norway did not support the US was, as with the 
UK over Iraq, a major consideration in policy over Afghanistan. This concern was 
held most strongly within the Norwegian MoD, for whom maintaining close working 
ties with the US was, and has long been, at the very heart of its mission.  Unlike the 
UK, however, Norwegian governments harboured far fewer illusions about the extent 
to which “full and unqualified support” would result in a greater ability to influence 
US policy. Indeed, although the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued the case for 
opening a political dialogue with the Taliban to its counterpart from an early stage, 
itself a commendable initiative, the Commission found that, overall, Norway made 
little systematic effort to influence and shape allied policies.75  
 That Norway’s relationship to the US came to exercise a determining 
influence on decisions over Afghanistan is not surprising. Ever since the US replaced 
the UK as Norway’s principal security guarantor in the 1950s, the strategic alliance 
with the US has been the bedrock of Norway’s defence and security policy. Norway’s 
position on NATO’s northern flank, its sparsely populated and extensive land and 
maritime territories, combined with its proximity to the strategically vital northeast 
and arctic territories of Russia (and earlier those of the Soviet Union), ensured that 
bilateral security ties assumed special importance for both countries. For Norway, the 
result was and remains a particularly strong attachment – reinforced by the country’s 
historical experience of defeat and occupation in the Second World War and its 
peripheral status in Europe – to the sanctity of NATO’s collective defence provisions 
and, above all, to preserving US defence commitments to Europe in general and 
Norway in particular.  
While the geopolitical changes spawned by the end of the Cold War 
necessarily altered the political climate and discourse around the content of Norway’s 
security policy, it did not fundamentally change the importance attached to ties with 
the US, especially not for those concerned with the working aspects of that 
relationship. Indeed, if anything, its importance was seen to have increased as NATO 
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allies in Europe were expected, not unreasonably, to take less of an interest in 
NATO’s northern flank. To many, the closing of NATO’s Atlantic Command in 2003 
and the subsequent move away from geographic to functional commands within the 
Alliance provided evidence to this effect. Throughout the course of Norway’s 
Afghanistan engagement, concerns among Norwegian defence planners and officials 
about any further weakening of collective defence provisions and ties with the US 
became, if anything, more pronounced.76 Russia’s adoption of a more “forward-
leaning stand both politically and militarily”77, evidenced by the 2008 war in Georgia, 
did much to drive those concerns and provided a key background influence to 
decision-making over Afghanistan.78 Added to this were also more immediate and 
concrete considerations relating to the defence and security relationship with the US.  
In the event of crises or war, Norway has long been entirely reliant on 
reinforcements from the US. Preparing for this eventuality, US stocks of military 
equipment were first prepositioned on Norwegian territory following agreement 
concluded in 1981.79 The agreement came up for renegotiation in 2005, and 
Norwegian authorities considered its revision and renewal vital to the future of the 
bilateral defence relationship.80 In June 2005, against the backdrop of NATO and 
Norway’s deepening involvement in Afghanistan, and following six months of 
reportedly “intensive” talks, Donald Rumsfeld and his counterpart, Kristin Krohn-
Devold, duly signed a revised MOU “governing prestockage and reinforcement of 
Norway”.81  
 
US, Norway and Afghanistan 
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Norwegian concerns about the possible consequences for US-Norwegian 
relations were it not to extend support to the US, influenced policy calculations in two 
ways. 
First, decisions about the kind of contributions to make were driven primarily 
by considerations – both explicit and implicit – of their likely political impact in 
relation to the US, rather than by a wider assessment of strategic requirements 
emanating from an analysis of developments on the ground.82 Thus, while Norwegian 
military planners and development officials expressed scepticism about the wisdom of 
assuming responsibility of the PRT in Faryab 2005, such misgivings were “trumped”, 
in the words of the Commission, by the desire to “appear relevant and visible” to 
allies.83 Appearing relevant and politically visible was also a key factor when it came 
to the deployment of Norwegian Special Forces (NORSOF), whose activities 
alongside the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) in Afghanistan were identified by 
the Godal Commission as one of three “central areas” of Norwegian involvement.84  
Second, concern about relations with Washington in practice limited the scope 
for questioning the wisdom of US and wider alliance policies in Afghanistan. In effect, 
the concern acted as a self-denying ordinance, restricting the government’s room for 
manoeuvre, for registering constructive dissent and voicing principled objections to 
actions that were not producing hoped-for results. It also provides an important part of 
the explanation for why Norway never seriously subjected its contribution to a 
rigorous and regular process of strategic analysis and reassessment.85  
All of this raises an obvious question: were Norwegian concerns about the 
negative, likely lasting, consequences for US-Norwegian relations of not lending 
unqualified support in Afghanistan truly justified?  
The question of whether or not concerns about meeting US and allied requests 
would damage Norway’s standing as an ally,  possibly with long-term consequences, 
arose most directly in 2006 and 2007. As military operations intensified following 
ISAF’s expansion southwards in 2006, Norwegian authorities came under growing 
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pressure to deploy forces in support of combat operations in the south. Allied interest 
focussed specifically on the combat capable Quick Reaction Force (QRF) that 
Norway had sent to Mazar-i-Sharif in March 2006 in order to support PRTs operating 
in Northern Afghanistan, and which it was now argued could be used as a mobile 
reserve elsewhere in Afghanistan.86 As fighting intensified in 2006 and 2007, 
Norwegian officials received numerous formal and informal requests for Norwegian 
forces to be made available for operations in the south.87 These came from a variety 
of sources:  from the UK, whose forces were meeting fierce resistance in Helmand, 
from SACEUR and COMISAF, as well as from the US government through its 
embassy in Oslo. Repeated requests placed the government in a quandary: given that 
Norway had formally endorsed the principle that ISAF contingents should operate 
without caveats and be available for deployment anywhere within the theatre of 
operation at COMISAF’s request, it was felt that turning down allied requests would 
likely be politically damaging.88 The MoD and the Chief of Defence, in particular, 
were concerned about the political consequences of repeated refusals, and called for a 
positive line to be taken if Norway wished to “remain in good standing within the 
alliance.”89 In the end, the government formally ruled out deploying its QRF to the 
south or to make other forces available in that area. The  decision was designed  to 
clarify Norway’s position vis-à-vis NATO allies, but above all to keep the Red-Green 
coalition together.  
And yet, for all this, and although UK and US officials at the time expressed 
frustration at Norwegian reluctance to deploy south, the Godal Commission could 
find no evidence to suggest that the refusal to do so “had serious or lasting 
consequences for relations with allies or for Norway’s standing within NATO”.90  
                     
86 The US also raised the issue of deploying Norway’s “Telemark Battalion” – a company-sized and 
mechanised Task Force of which had been deployed to provide security during the Constitutional Loya 
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88 Godal Commission, p.33. 
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There were several reasons for this. For one, it is clear that Norway’s 
contribution would in any event have been very modest. Furthermore, the decision to 
extend the deployment of Norwegian Special Forces to Kabul in 2007 – whose impact 
was politically and operationally more visible to the US – may partly have 
compensated for the reluctance to assist in the south.91 Signs that the security situation 
was deteriorating also in Northern Afghanistan made the Norwegian argument that 
troops were needed in the north seem less self-serving. Arguably just as significant 
was the fact that Norway was not proposing to withdraw from ISAF and Afghanistan 
altogether. For the US Administration, this meant that the multinational character of 
the operation, however small or symbolic the contribution of individual allies, would 
not be weakened. This was an important consideration  for an administration that 
needed to legitimise continued involvement in the war before Congress, which, after 
all, was paying for it, and probably outweighed the military value added by the actual 
contribution allies were prepared and able to offer. 
In addition to these factors, however, and more fundamentally, the strength of 
long-established alliance bonds and the mutual benefits deriving from these were 
always unlikely to be ruptured by Norway’s self-imposed restrictions. After all, 
Norway’s decision not to support the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, in spite of US 
requests, had not adversely affected relations.92 As noted above, the benefits of the 
alliance relationship had always flowed both ways. If Norway looked to the US as its 
ultimate security guarantor, for the US, Norway’s location had long provided – and 
continues to provide – a critically important window to monitoring military 
developments in northeast and arctic Russia (whose contiguous maritime areas in the 
Barents Sea form a “bastion” for the bulk of Russia’s submarine ballistic missile 
fleet)93. These facts explain why a particularly close and long-lasting bilateral 
relationship has evolved in the field of intelligence, especially in the area of SIGINT – 
                     
91From 2007 onwards, Norwegian SOF played a central role, together with US and New Zealand forces, 
in building up, training and providing operational support to the Crisis Response Unit 22 (CRU 22), a 
counterterrorism unit of the Afghan police based in Kabul. “Godal Report”, chapter 5.  
92 Although the government refused to support the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, it did feel 
compelled to provide a “symbolic” contribution in the form of military engineers from June 2003 to 
2005; a deployment which the government, in order to defuse strong domestic criticism, insisted was 
entirely “humanitarian” in nature. “Bondeviks fiksjon”, Dagbladet, 18 November 2003, 
http://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/bondeviks-fiksjon/65927698 
93 Rolf Tamnes, “The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Contribution”, in NATO 
and the North Atlantic – Revitalising Collective Defence, ed. by John Andreas Olsen, RUSI Whitehall 
Paper 87, 2017, pp. 21-26. 
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a relationship that, in the words of the Godal Commission, provided a “solid basis” 
for further developing and deepening cooperation in Afghanistan.94  
 
Costs and Lessons – what are allies for?  
 
These findings do raise the larger question of whether, and in what ways, 
Norwegian concerns about avoiding actions that might undermine relations with a key 
ally, however exaggerated, carried other costs as far as Norway’s involvement in 
Afghanistan was concerned? Two, partly overlapping, issues stand out in this regard.  
First, it is clear that the desire to remain a “good ally” encouraged a passive 
and, generally, unquestioning attitude to issues relating to the prosecution of the war 
that might otherwise have been subject to more searching questions and critical 
scrutiny. The Godal Commission draws attention in particular to the legally and 
morally complex issues arising out of the US-driven targeting policies under the Joint 
Prioritised Effects List (“kill or capture”) programme, most notably the US initiative 
in October 2008 to expand the category of targets to include “facilities and facilitators 
supporting the insurgency”.95 This controversial initiative, designed to disrupt 
Taliban’s income stream and logistical chain, was resisted by several European allies 
(including Germany and France), and resulted in “night raids and house searches … 
[that] blurred the distinction between farmers, ‘high-value targets’ or Taliban 
operatives.”96 Norwegian authorities, according to the Godal Commission, initially 
showed little apparent concern about the expansion of target categories and took little 
active part in NATO discussions on the subject.97  
Second, and more importantly, the determination to be a “good ally” 
discouraged critical debate and regular reassessment at the highest level of 
                     
94 Godal Report, pp. 70-71. For the history and intimate character of that relationship see Olav Riste, 
The Norwegian Intelligence Service 1945-1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp.289-291; and relevant 
chapters in Tamnes’ definitive account of US-Norwegian relations during the Cold War, Rolf Tamnes, 
Cold War in the High North. 
95 The decision in principle to expand ISAF’s counter narcotics role was taken at the meeting of NATO 
Defence Ministers in Budapest in 2008 and supported by Norway. Godal Report, p.170. For details of 
the policy change, see Judy Dempsey, “NATO allows strikes on Afghan drug sites Ministers agree to 
major strategic shift,” International Herald Tribune, 11 October 2008. For a background to the 
controversies surrounding JPPL and the focus on kill-and-capture more generally, see “A Dubious 
History of Targeted Killings in Afghanistan”, 28 December 2014, Spiegel Online 
(www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-docs-reveal-dubious-details-of-targeted-killings-in-
afghanistan-a-1010358.html) 
96 Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Affectations”, p.15 
97 Godal Report, p.170. 
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government about the effectiveness of Norway’s military, police and developmental 
contribution to the Afghanistan mission, even as developments on the ground pointed 
to the urgent need for such debate. The absence of any “stabilisation effect” as a result 
of ISAF’s expansion outside Kabul; mounting insecurity even as overall troop 
numbers increased; the complex political economy and the frequently localised nature 
of the “insurgency” that defied conventional development initiatives and distorted aid 
delivery; the severe legitimacy deficit of the central government in Kabul; none of 
these factors prompted a reconsideration of basic assumptions about ISAF’s chosen 
strategy, raising questions comparable to those famously posed by Karl Eikenberry in 
a confidential cable to Washington where he challenged the wisdom and fundamental 
premises of US COIN strategy in 2009. 
One should, of course, have no illusions about the ability of smaller allies to 
influence US policy in Afghanistan. Even more powerful allies, like the UK, appear 
to have had at most a marginal influence on the direction of US policy, whether in 
Iraq or Afghanistan.98 There is nothing to suggest that a different and more 
independent approach by Norway would have influenced US policy in significant 
ways. Even so, developments on the ground should have fed back into an assessment 
of Norway’s own contribution to stimulate a far more critical debate about what one 
was hoping to accomplish and  a consideration of policy adjustments .   
 
Concluding Observations  
 
The Norwegian contribution to operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 
was plainly of marginal relevance to the overall outcome of the international 
intervention in the country.99 Even so, the fine-grained analysis provided by the Godal 
Commission, especially of developments within Norway’s area of responsibility in 
northern Afghanistan, offers lessons of broader interest regarding the role of small 
and medium-sized coalition members in international operations, about the limits of 
exogenous statebuilding and about the recent history of conflict in Afghanistan.   
                     
98 Sherard Cowper-Coles, “Reflections from Afghanistan”, in Rethinking State Fragility, British 
Academy Publication, April 2015, p. 20. 
99 For an overview and comparison of the contributions made by different ISAF members, see Marion 
Bogers, Robert Beeres and Iren Lubberman-Schrotenboer, “Dutch Treat? – Burden sharing in 
Afghanistan”, in Mission Uruzgan – Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan, ed. by 
Robert Beeres, Jan van der Meulen, Jospeh Soeters and Ad Vogelaar (Utrecht: Pallas Publications, 
2012), pp.267-281.  
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The first “lesson”  concerns Norway’s decision to join, as well as its 
unwavering commitment over thirteen years to, the international project in 
Afghanistan. The initial decision to participate in coalition operations was powerfully 
motivated  – as indeed it was for other allies – by the desire to demonstrate solidarity 
with the US following the attacks of 9/11. In the context of its time and given 
Norway’s long-standing alliance relationship to the US, this was neither surprising 
nor unreasonable. Even for a small and historically close ally, however, the 
requirement of alliance solidarity does not absolve the government of responsibility 
for regularly reviewing and, when required, reassessing strategy in light of new 
developments and changing circumstances. In doing so, the option of withdrawing 
from coalition operations should never be ruled out, and concerns about the direction 
of policy, especially when it rests on questionable assumptions and weak analysis, 
must be probed within government and communicated to allies, not papered over in 
the interests of alliance solidarity. At the same time, and as the Godal Commission 
also notes, the large-scale commitment of troops, civilians and developmental 
resources to an international operation of the complexity of Afghanistan requires 
greater openness vis-à-vis the public as well as Parliament about the objectives of 
involvement than was the case in Norway between 2001 and 2014.100    
Finally, two further and closely connected lessons merit attention on account 
of their wider relevance. First, as the Commission bluntly and candidly concluded, 
regime change and state-building activities of the kind attempted in Afghanistan “are 
well-nigh impossible in contexts of on-going armed conflict”.101 Second, external 
involvement designed to help lay the foundations for durable peace must, as a matter 
of course, prioritise an open-minded and inclusive search for political dialogue and 
negotiated settlement as a pathway out of protracted conflict. The Norwegian 
government, as the Commission fairly acknowledges, deserves credit for recognising 
                     
100 In 2016, Norwegian Special Forces deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve fighting ISIS 
in Syria and Iraq. Initially deployed to Jordan, Norwegian troops later joined Special Forces from the 
US and the UK at At Tanf in southern Syria to help “train, advise and support local Syrian groups 
fighting ISIL in Syria”. The deployment confirmed the Godal report’s findings about the increasingly 
close relationship developed with US in “CT and other SOF operations” resulting from years of 
cooperation in Afghanistan. At the same time, the deployment also raised questions about the extent to 
which “the aims of [Norwegian] involvement were clear and [had been] properly communicated to 
parliament and the wider public”, as the Godal Commission, insisted should be done when deploying 
to active conflict zones. To many, being “a good ally” was again the driving factor for becoming 
involved. Godal Report, p. 203; “Pressemelding, 2 May 2016, Forsvarsdepartementet” 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/nyyt-bidrag/id2499023/); Nabih Bulos and W. J. Hennigan “US 
Airstrike hit Pro-Assad Forces in Syria”, Los Angeles Times, 18 May 2017. 
101Godal Report, p. 12.  
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this and for being prepared – from an early stage and through active behind-the-
scenes diplomacy – to explore any opportunity for moving the political process in 
Afghanistan forward. The fact that, in the end, nothing of substance was achieved on 
this front does not invalidate the central importance, in current and future 
international operations, of investing resources, time and effort in building the 
political foundation for peace. 
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